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NO MEANS NO?: WITHDRAWAL OF
CONSENT DURING INTERCOURSE AND
THE CONTINUING EVOLUTION OF THE
DEFINITION OF RAPE
MATTHEW R. LYON*
"[A] withdrawal of consent effectively nullifies any earlier consent and subjects the
male to forcible rape charges if he persists in what has become nonconsensual
intercourse."
1




At approximately 6:30 P.M. on March 23, 2000, 17-year-old Laura T.
left her job at a Safeway supermarket in El Dorado County, California and
picked up Juan G., a young man whom she had met two weeks earlier.
3
Laura drove Juan to a "party" at a friend's house, where the only guests
were the two of them and three of Juan's male friends.4 All of those
present, except Laura, were drinking beer. 5 At approximately 8:10 P.M.,
* J.D. Candidate 2005, Northwestern University School of Law. Thank you to
my wife Angie for her love and support and to Professor Dorothy Roberts for her
valued advice and guidance.
1 People v. John Z., 60 P.3d 183, 184 (Cal. 2003).
2 Kathleen Parker, Rape California-Style is a Woman's Prerogative, ORLANDO SENTINEL,
Jan. 12, 2003, at G3.




Laura was ready to leave, but she first agreed to join Juan and one of his
friends, 16-year old John Z., in a bedroom of the house.6
Upon entering the unlit bedroom together, Laura, Juan, and John
engaged in consensual sexual interaction, not including intercourse.7 As the
relations intensified, Juan put on a condom and John left the room.8 At this
point, Laura then began to object, but despite her physical resistance and
pleas to the contrary, Juan forced Laura to have sexual intercourse. 9 After
the rape terminated due to Laura's struggling, Juan left the room.10 As
Laura searched for her clothes in the dark bedroom, John entered the room
with his clothes off.1
John asked Laura to lie down with him, and then began kissing her and
telling her she had a "beautiful body" and that she should be his girlfriend. 12
Laura kissed John back, and John then climbed on top of Laura and put his
penis inside of her. 13  The two engaged in sexual intercourse for
approximately ten minutes, during which time Laura physically struggled
with John. 14 Laura told John several minutes into the act that she "needed
to go home"; John responded for Laura to "just give me a minute."' 5 Twice
more, Laura repeated: "No, I need to go home."' 16 After Laura's objections,
John continued to have sexual intercourse with her for approximately sixty
6 Id. According to Laura's testimony, she, John and Juan had been alone in the bedroom
earlier in the evening. At that time, the boys spoke to her about how she wouldn't do
"stuff"; Laura replied that she wasn't ready to do anything and left the room. John Z., 60
P.3d at 184; App. Brief, supra note 3, at 3.
7 John Z., 60 P.3d at 184; App. Brief, supra note 3, at 3. This interaction included the
removal of Laura's clothes. The boys fondled Laura's breasts and digitally penetrated her.
App. Brief, supra note 3, at 3. Juan also "asked Laura if it was her fantasy to have two guys,
and Laura said it was not." John Z., 60 P.3d at 184.
8 John Z., 60 P.3d at 184-85.
9 Id. at 185. Juan was originally a co-defendant in this case, but at the close of the
victim's testimony he reached a plea agreement with the prosecution, admitting to sexual





14 Id. Laura testified that after penetration, John rolled her over on top of him for about
four to five minutes, during which time she tried to pull away several times, and told John
that if "he really cared about her he wouldn't be doing this to her." Id. John then rolled
Laura over onto her back. Id. Laura never stated to John, either prior to or during




EVOLUTION OF THE DEFINITION RAPE
to ninety seconds before discontinuing the act. 17 As Laura dressed and
prepared to leave, John turned to her and said, "Well, I didn't rape you so
you cannot call the cops."
'18
Rape is defined in California as "an act of sexual intercourse...
accomplished against a person's will by means of force, violence, duress,
menace, or fear of immediate and unlawful bodily injury on the person or
another."' 9 In the incident described above, Laura willingly entered the
bedroom with Juan and John, took her clothes off and engaged in sexual
foreplay with the two boys.2° When John entered the room, she kissed him,
lay naked on the bed with him, and expressed no objection when the two
began engaging in intercourse together.2' However, on January 6, 2003, the
California Supreme Court held in a 6-1 opinion that John was a rapist.22 In
doing so, the court interpreted the state's rape statute to include situations
where the victim initially consents to intercourse, but then withdraws her
consent after penetration.23
Under the traditional common law definition of rape, the prosecution
and conviction of John Z. would have been unthinkable.24 However,
California is one of seven states in which the courts have expanded the
definition of rape to include the withdrawal of consent after penetration.
25
Additionally, in response to the John Z. decision, Illinois became the first
state to pass a statute redefining "nonconsent" in sexual assault cases to
include situations where consent is withdrawn after penetration. 26  The
reforms in California and Illinois, combined with the sexual assault charges
levied, and then subsequently dropped, in Eagle, Colorado, against NBA
superstar Kobe Bryant, have focused an unprecedented amount of media
attention on the issue of sexual assault and consent of the victim. 27 The
17 Id. Laura testified that each time she repeated her assertion that she "needed to go
home," John asked for more time and continued the sexual intercourse. Id. John claimed
that the entire act was consensual, and that he got off of Laura as soon as she told him she
needed to leave. Id.
18 App. Brief, supra note 3, at 4.
19 CAL. PENAL CODE § 261 (a)(2) (Deering 2004).
20 See supra note 7 and accompanying text.
21 John Z., 60 P.3d at 185.
22 Id. at 188.
23 Id. at 184.
24 See discussion infra Part II.A.
25 See discussion infra Parts I.B, II1.A.
26 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/12-17(c) (2004); see discussion infra Part III.B.
27 See, e.g., Matt Bean, Saying Yes, Then No: Bryant Case Enters National Debate,




reactions of feminists, scholars, and others in the legal community and
media at large have ranged from highly supportive to stridently negative.28
This comment places the 2003 actions of the California Supreme Court
and the Illinois legislature in context with reforms over the past thirty years
that challenged the long history of rape laws written by, and designed to
support, men. It argues that the California and Illinois responses, while
somewhat controversial, are important steps in rape law reform in the
United States that are necessary to fully protect the rights of sexual assault
victims.
Section I provides a brief description of the evolution of the definition
of rape over the past twenty-five years. Reform efforts have manifested
themselves most significantly in two areas: the near-eradication of the
marital rape exemption, and an increased emphasis on nonconsent of the
victim, resulting in the removal of the force requirement as an element of
sexual assault in some jurisdictions.29
Section II outlines the current state of the law in cases where consent is
initially given, and then withdrawn. Some state court decisions in the
1980s reinforced the common-law rule that if consent is given initially, the
act cannot be considered rape.30 In contrast, several recent state court
decisions have broadened the definition of rape or sexual assault to include
situations where consent is initially given but later withdrawn by the
victim.
31
Section III compares the two methods of including post-penetration
rape within the statutory definition of rape. Seven states have enacted this
reform by judicial decision, while one has chosen to do so by statute.32
California and Illinois, as two recent high-profile examples, provide the
most guidance to other states considering the reform. 33
Section IV describes some of the specific criticisms of the expansion
of the rape definition in California, Illinois, and other jurisdictions. General
criticisms of the policy fall into three categories: (1) it creates an
unworkable rule because it is impossible to define a reasonable amount of
time for the partner to stop after the women withdraws her consent; (2) it
victimizes men; and (3) it trivializes the harm done to those women who are
victims of "actual" rapes. 34 Some advocates raise an additional concern
28 See discussion infra Part IV.
29 See discussion infra Part I.
30 See discussion infra Part II.A.
31 See discussion infra Part II.B.
32 See discussion infra Part III.
33 See discussion infra Part III.
34 See discussion infra Part IV.A.
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regarding reform by statute, claiming that it actually minimizes the rights of
the victim by transforming them from constitutional rights to statutory
rights.35  However, both the overwhelming need for change and the
controversial nature of this policy require that legislatures, as well as the
courts, position themselves to enact these reforms.
With public attention currently focused on the issue of post-penetration
rape, courts and state legislatures around the country should seek to
modernize rape statutes to protect all victims of nonconsensual intercourse,
regardless of when those victims manifest their lack of consent.
BACKGROUND
I. MODERN REFORMS IN THE DEFINITION OF SEXUAL ASSAULT
Under the English common law, rape was defined as "carnal
knowledge of a woman forcibly and against her will. '36 This definition
included three elements: intercourse, force, and lack of consent.37
American jurisdictions almost universally adopted the three common law
elements and maintain them even today.38 However, the late twentieth
century was marked by a series of reforms of rape laws, beginning with the
proposed definition of rape in the Model Penal Code.39 This new wave of
reforms arose from the feminist movement of the 1970s, and has continued
to the present day. 40 Feminists, progressive legal scholars, and victims'
advocates have sought to "transform the aim of rape law as well as to
expand society's understanding of what constitutes rape.' '
The efforts to reform rape law in the United States over the past thirty
years are far too significant to be comprehensively covered in this space.
However, two types of reforms provide context for the recent decisions in
35 See discussion infra Part IV.B.
36 CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, SEX EQUALITY: RAPE LAW 801 (2001) (quoting WILLIAM
BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 210 (1765)).
37 SANFORD H. KADISH & STEPHEN J. SCHULHOFER, CRIMINAL LAW AND ITS PROCESSES
318 (7th ed. 2001).
38 Id.
39 Id. The Model Penal Code definition maintains the marital rape exemption and the
force requirement, but includes within the definition of rape situations where the female's
power to consent is impaired, including where the female is unconscious or under the
influence of drugs or intoxicants administered by the male without her knowledge. The
definition also includes degrees of rape. MODEL PENAL CODE AND COMMENTARIES §
213.1 (1) (Proposed Official Draft 1962) [hereinafter MODEL CODE].
40 KADISH & SCHULHOFER, supra note 37, at 318.
41 JUDITH G. GREENBERG, MARTHA L. MINOW, AND DOROTHY E. ROBERTS, WOMEN AND
THE LAW 776 (3d ed. 2004) [hereinafter WOMEN AND THE LAW].
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some states to include post-penetration withdrawal of consent within the
state's definition of rape. These reforms are: (1) the partial abolition of the
marital rape exemption; and (2) the increased emphasis on the nonconsent
of the victim, rather than the use of force by the attacker, in defining rape.
A. PARTIAL ABOLITION OF THE MARITAL RAPE EXEMPTION
Historically, rape law was designed to regulate "competing male
interests in controlling sexual access to females, rather than protecting
women's interest in controlling their own bodies and sexuality. ' '42  No
vestige of the common law of rape represents this more than the marital
rape exemption. Until reform efforts began to take hold in the late 1970s,
the definition of rape in nearly every American jurisdiction explicitly stated
that husbands could not be prosecuted for raping their wives.43 The origin
of the marital rape exemption is widely attributed to the eighteenth-century
English jurist Sir Matthew Hale, who wrote: "[T]he husband cannot be
guilty of a rape committed by himself upon his lawful wife, for by their
mutual matrimonial consent and contract the wife hath given up herself in
this kind unto the husband which she cannot retract."44
The drafters of the Model Penal Code, who to some degree sought to
revise the common law definition of rape, chose to maintain an absolute
marital rape exemption.45 The commentary to the Model Penal Code,
which defends the marital rape exemption as avoiding an "unwanted
intrusion of the penal law into the life of the family," constitutes a modem
defense to Hale's eighteenth-century position.46 Some defend the marital
rape exemption on the grounds that it represents the merger of a man and a
42 Id.
43 Jill Elaine Hasday, Content and Consent: A Legal History of Marital Rape, 88 CAL. L.
REV. 1373, 1376 (2000).
4 DIANA E. H. RUSSELL, RAPE IN MARRIAGE 17 (2d ed. 1990) (quoting MATTHEW HALE,
HISTORIES OF THE PLEAS OF THE CROWN (1736)). This reasoning as to generalized consent-
that a woman cannot retract her consent to sexual intercourse once she enters into
marriage-is the same used to argue that, if a woman initially consents to an individual
sexual act, she then is proscribed from withdrawing that consent during the act.
45 Hasday, supra note 43, at 1487. The Code mirrors the language of many state statutes
in stating that "a male who has sexual intercourse with a female not his wife is guilty of
sexual rape if .... MODEL CODE, supra note 39, § 213.1(1). It also recommends extending
the immunity to couples who are living together "as man and wife" but are not formally
married. Id. § 213.6(2).
46 MODEL CODE, supra note 39, § 213.1(1) cmt. at 345 (1980). The commentary also
states that "marriage or equivalent relationship, while not amounting to a legal waiver of the
woman's right to say 'no,' does imply a kind of generalized consent that distinguishes some
versions of the crime of rape from parallel behavior by a husband." MODEL CODE, supra
note 39, § 213.1(1) cmt. at 344.
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woman into a single legal entity upon their marriage. 4' 7 The defense of the
exemption also stems from a "cultural need" to understand the relationship
between a husband and wife as "consensual and harmonious. '48
When feminist legal scholars began to attack existing rape provisions
with vigor in the early 1970s, the marital rape exemption was one of the
first targets.4 9 Most of the progress in removing the exemption was made
during the 1980s, when the number of states in which husbands could be
prosecuted for raping their wives increased from nine to forty-two, plus the
District of Columbia. 50 Some states chose to abolish the exemption through
statutory means; on at least one occasion, this resulted in publicity that gave
life to both the reform movement and its critics. 51 Other states required
intervention through the courts to abolish or reform their marital rape
52statutes. Today, roughly half of the states have struck the general marital
immunity clause out of their rape statutes entirely, while only two states
still preserve a broad marital rape exemption. 53 The remaining states allow
prosecution for rape of a wife by her husband, but with some qualifications
47 WOMEN AND THE LAW, supra note 41, at 862.
48 Hasday, supra note 43, at 1381 ("Never do we hear more about the joys of marital
love, trust, and intimacy in a contemporary legal context than when courts, lawmakers, and
commentators justify the preservation of a husband's legal right to rape his wife."); see also
WOMEN AND THE LAW, supra note 41, at 863.
49 In her seminal work Against Our Will, Susan Brownmiller writes: "A sexual assault is
an invasion of bodily integrity and a violation of freedom and self-determination wherever it
happens to take place, in or out of the marriage bed." SUSAN BROWNMILLER, AGAINST OUR
WILL: MEN, WOMEN, AND RAPE 381 (1975).
50 RUSSELL, supra note 44, at 21.
51 Oregon deleted the marital rape exemption from its rape statute in 1977. Id. at 18. A
year later, it became the first state to prosecute a husband for the rape of his wife while he
was still living with her. Lalenya Wientraub Siegel, Note, The Marital Rape Exemption:
Evolution to Extinction, 43 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 351, 364-65 (1995) (citing State v. Rideout,
No. 108,866 (Marion County Cir. Ct., Or. Dec. 17, 1978) (unreported)). When the
defendant, John Rideout, was acquitted, the trial raised national attention regarding the issue
of marital rape. Supporters of the reform welcomed the attention to the issue; critics argued
that the couple's subsequent reconciliation proved that the statute was an unwarranted
intrusion into private relationships. RUSSELL, supra note 44, at 20-21.
52 The Court of Appeals of New York struck down the marital rape exemption in 1984,
finding that "a marriage license should not be viewed as a license for a husband to forcibly
rape his wife with impunity." People v. Liberta, 474 N.E.2d 567, 573 (N.Y. 1984).
53 KADISH & SCHULHOFER, supra note 37, at 370. The only two states that retain the
marital rape exemption in its traditional common law form are Kentucky and Oklahoma.




attached (i.e., requiring a lesser punishment than nonmarital rape, or only
allowing prosecution if a certain level of force is used).54
Complete immunity for spousal rape was a common law standard that
existed for hundreds of years. Its near-eradication in a generation provides
a model for those who seek further reform of the rape laws in this country.
B. INCREASED EMPHASIS ON THE VICTIM'S NONCONSENT
Under the common law, the crime of rape must include both the
element of force by the attacker and the element of nonconsent of the
victim.55 In response to the proposed definition of rape under the Model
Penal Code, many states revised their statutes to increase the emphasis on
the use of force during the sexual act.56 Reacting to critics of this trend,
however, many jurisdictions subsequently deemphasized the importance of
force in defining rape by loosening the requirement of physical resistance
by the victim. 57 A few states have gone even further and turned to the
nonconsent of the victim as the ultimate factor in determining if a rape has
occurred. 58 Although an absolute reliance on nonconsent is not required to
accept the idea of post-penetration withdrawal of consent as rape, it still
represents a crucial step in the modernization of rape laws.
1. The Model Penal Code's Emphasis on Force
As the authors of the Model Penal Code considered a reformed rape
statute, they noted that the consent element was more ambiguous than the
force element.59 In fact, the commentators found it necessary for the Code
to "draw a line between forcible rape on the one hand and reluctant
54 KADISH & SCHULHOFER, supra note 37, at 370; see also RUSSELL, supra note 44, at 21-
23 (discussing the variations among state laws as of January 1990). Skeptics of the impact
of the reform of marital rape laws note the limited changes in many states, as well as the fact
that marital rapes are not prosecuted any more frequently than before the reforms took hold.
Telephone Interview with Wendy Murphy, Director, Victim Advocacy & Research Group
(Mar. 2, 2004) [hereinafter Interview with Wendy Murphy, Victim Advocacy & Research
Group].
55 MARGARET T. GORDON & STEPHANIE RIGER, THE FEMALE FEAR 57-59 (1989).
Traditionally, this puts the burden of proof on the prosecutor to show both that the defendant
forced himself on the victim, and also that the victim asserted her nonconsent to her
assailant's actions. Id. at 58.
56 See discussion infra Part I.B. 1.
57 See discussion infra Part I.B.2.
58 See discussion infra Parts I.B.3.
59 STEPHEN J. SCHULHOFER, UNWANTED SEX: THE CULTURE OF INTIMIDATION AND THE
FAILURE OF LAW 23 (1998).
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submission on the other."60  They therefore proposed a rule that would
define rape as sexual intercourse only where the man compels the woman
"to submit by force or threat of imminent death, serious bodily injury,
extreme pain or kidnapping, to be inflicted on anyone.'
The proposed reform of the Model Code placed the emphasis not on
the woman's consent to the act, or lack of it, but solely on the defendant's
misconduct.62 The authors of the code had purportedly sought to produce a
modem rape statute that would more adequately protect rape victims.
63
Instead, the modification they proposed rendered moot the victim's
subjective (or even objective) manifestation of her lack of consent to her
attacker.64
During the 1960s, a number of states followed the lead of the Model
Penal Code and revised their rape statutes to place a much greater emphasis
on force, at the expense of using the victim's nonconsent as an indicator of
guilt.65 The revised statutes reinforced an emphasis on physical violence,
rather than minimizing it.66 As courts looked to force as the predominantly
defining feature of rape, they began to apply a resistance standard rather
than a consent standard.67 A consent standard, advocated by many
reformers, "would be one in which rape is proved where the fact-finders are
satisfied that the female's mental condition was such as to withhold her
60 Id. at 22-23. The commentary reveals a not-so-subtle critique of women's ability to
know whether or not they have "consented" to a sexual act: "Women were thought to be
unable to express their sexual desires directly; beset by 'conflicting emotions,' women, in
this view, might not know what they themselves actually wanted." Id. at 23 (criticizing the
decision of the authors of the Code to avoid the consent issue).
61 MODEL CODE, supra note 39, § 213.1(1)(a); SCHULHOFER, supra note 59, at 22-23; see
also SUSAN ESTRICH, REAL RAPE 58-60 (1987).
62 ESTRICH, supra note 61, at 59.
63 SCHULHOFER, supra note 59, at 22 (noting that the move away from consent was, at
least in part, "progressive and well-intended"). "The reformers saw the concept of consent
as an invitation to put the victim on trial and to divert attention from the defendant's
misconduct." Id.
64 Id.; see also Deborah W. Denno, Why the Model Penal Code's Sexual Offense
Provisions Should be Pulled and Replaced, 1 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 207, 210 (2003)
(suggesting significant reforms to the Code and specifically noting that the Code's emphasis
on objective measures "have backfired in light of today's attitudes towards sexual force").
65 SCHULHOFER, supra note 59, at 23-24; ESTRICH, supra note 61, at 59. New York,
which previously had defined force in terms of the victim's "earnest resistance," revised its
rape statute to require "forcible compulsion." N.Y. PENAL LAW § 130.35 (McKinney 2004).
"Lack of consent by the victim, in turn, can result only from forcible compulsion or by an
incapacity to consent." SCHULHOFER, supra, at 24.
66 SCHULHOFER, supra note 59, at 24.
67 KADISH & SCHULHOFER, supra note 37, at 329; see also SUE BESSMER, THE LAWS OF
RAPE 178-90 (1984) (discussing the use of resistance as an indicator of nonconsent).
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consent., 68 However, the Model Penal Code had the opposite effect of
defining nonconsent solely in terms of physical evidence of resistance to the
attacker. 69 As a result, some defendants who clearly forced intercourse onto
women without their consent had their convictions overturned because their
victims were not able to show beyond a reasonable doubt the requisite
amount of physical resistance.70
In response to the trend towards using physical force to define, rather
than supplement, a victim's nonconsent, feminist legal reformers argued
that the revised laws were working to victims' detriment, rather than
helping them. 71 In addition, the revitalized resistance standard represented
yet another unwanted imposition of a male standard on the crime of rape,
the vast majority of victims of which are women. 72  Reformers began to
promote legal definitions of rape that marginalized the use of force, or at the
very least broadened its definition beyond physical violence, and placed
more of an emphasis on the victim's testimony regarding consent.
73
States responded to this push for reform both by legislative statute and
in the courts.74 Some states have loosened the rigid resistance requirement
and relied more on the victim's reported state of mind at the time of the
act.75 More significantly, a minority of states shifted towards removing
68 BESSMER, supra note 67, at 178.
69 KADISH & SCHULHOFER, supra note 37, at 329; BESSMER, supra note 67, at 178-90.
70 See State v. Alston, 312 S.E.2d 470 (N.C. 1984) (holding that lack of physical
resistance meant abusive ex-boyfriend's intercourse with victim without her consent was not
rape); ESTRICH, supra note 61, at 60-63 (describing Alston and criticizing the definition of
"force" adopted by the North Carolina court); see also State v. Thompson, 792 P.2d 1103
(Mont. 1990) (holding that high school principal's threats that student would not graduate if
she did not submit to intercourse could not be considered force, as the definition of force
does not include intimidation, fear, or apprehension).
71 BESSMER, supra note 67, at 180 (arguing that where the resistance standard is applied
rigorously, it places "stringent demands" on the victim).
72 See ESTRICH, supra note 61, at 60. "In rape the male standard defines a crime that,
traditionally by law and still predominantly in practice, is committed only by men against
women." Id.; see also BROWNMILLER, supra note 49, at 369 (arguing that the resistance
standard placates men's concerns "that beyond the female's oath, her word, her testimony,
there was not mutual intercourse and subsequent vindictiveness and wrath, but an objective,
tangible crime").
73 See Susan Estrich, Rape, 95 YALE L.J. 1087, 1182 (1986) ("[A]t the very least the
criminal law ought to say clearly that women who actually say no must be respected as
meaning it; that nonconsent means saying no; that men who proceed nonetheless, claiming
that they thought no meant yes, have acted unreasonably and unlawfully.").
74 KADISH & SCHULHOFER, supra note 37, at 329.
75 Id.; see discussion infra Part I.B.2.
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force entirely as an element of the crime of rape, concentrating solely on the
consensual nature of the act.
7 6
2. Loosening of the Resistance Requirement
The extent to which a victim resists her attacker with physical force
has long been considered a necessary indicator of the female's nonconsent
to the sexual act.77 The purpose of a resistance requirement is both to show
a physical manifestation of the victim's nonconsent and to provide a
(purportedly objective) standard by which prosecutors and factfinders can
determine if there was nonconsent. 78  The Commentaries to the Model
Penal Code actually seemed to recommend that states abolish the resistance
requirement. 79 However, the vast majority of states ignored this directive,
instead choosing to follow the Code's (seemingly contradictory) emphasis
on force.80 Thus, prior to reforms that began in the 1970s, the resistance
requirement was still explicitly included in many state rape statutes.
81
States varied as to the amount of resistance required to show that an
act was against the victim's will. 82 The most rigid standards, applied in
most states up until the 1970s, required the victim to show the "utmost
resistance., 83 Today, only one state still requires that a victim resist to the
"utmost." 84  Nearly all states have liberalized the rule, with about half
requiring the victim only to meet a reasonableness standard of resistance.
85
76 See discussion infra Part I.B.3.
77 BESSMER, supra note 67, at 177.
78 GoRDON & RIGER, supra note 55, at 59.
79 SCHULHOFER, supra note 59, at 21. The commentators, seeking to modernize rape
statutes, found that the common law resistance requirement was antiquated and harmful to
victims. See, e.g., id at 19 (citing Whittaker v. State, 50 Wis. 519, 522 (1880) (overturning
conviction of defendant who raped a victim at gunpoint because "submission... no matter
how reluctantly yielded, removes from the act an essential element of the crime of rape")).
80 Id. at 24; see also Denno, supra note 64, at 211-17 (contrasting the "progressive"
nature of the Commentaries with the now-outdated language of the Code itself).
81 SCHULHOFER, supra note 59, at 24; KADISH & SCHULHOFER, supra note 37, at 329.
82 GORDON & RIGER, supra note 55, at 59.
83 Id. "Utmost resistance" means in general terms "that the victim did everything
possible, exercised every physical means within her power, to prevent the assailant from
completing the assault." Id. The standard as applied in many states also included a
requirement that the victim's resistance not subside until after penetration. Michelle J.
Anderson, Reviving Resistance in Rape Law, 1998 U. ILL. L. REV. 953, 963.
84 Louisiana retains the "utmost resistance" standard for the crime of aggravated rape,
but requires a lesser standard for crimes of forcible and simple rape. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§
14:42(A)(1), 14:42.1, 14:43 (West 2004).
85 KADISH & SCHULHOFER, supra note 37, at 329. The reasonableness standard judges
resistance relative to circumstances surrounding the alleged assault and the victim's physical
and mental state. GORDON & RIGER, supra note 55, at 59.
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Several additional states actually eliminated the resistance standard
entirely. 86  Though many states rejected the resistance requirement via
legislative action, the most widely cited rejection of the resistance
requirement occurred in a decision by the Maryland Court of Appeals.
8 7
There, the court upheld a defendant's rape conviction where the victim
acquiesced to intercourse, without physical resistance, out of fear for her
own safety.88
Evidence of the practical impact of removing the resistance standard is
mixed.89 Within states that have removed the formal resistance requirement
entirely, courts "continue to consider resistance (or its absence) as highly
probative on the question of whether the victim consented." 90 Prosecutors
still rate the use of physical force as the most important single factor in
securing convictions of rape defendants. 9' Generally, however, the
liberalization and partial elimination of the formal resistance requirement is
viewed as a positive development for victims because it broadens the ways
in which they may manifest their nonconsent.
92
3. Removal of Force as an Element of Rape
Another reform in this area, albeit one that has received much less
acceptance among the states, is the removal of force entirely as an element
of the crime of rape.93 Under this approach, all incidents of nonconsensual
86 SCHULHOFER, supra note 59, at 30; KADISH & SCHULHOFER, supra note 37, at 329.
States that have completely eliminated the resistance requirement by statute include
Michigan, Ohio, Pennsylvania, and New Jersey. See, e.g., MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §
750.520(a) (West 2004); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:14-2c(l) (West 2004); OHIO REv. CODE ANN.
§ 2907.02 (West 2004); PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 18-3121 (West 2004).
87 State v. Rusk, 424 A.2d 720 (Md. 1981).
88 Id. at 737 ("[T]he old rule of 'resistance to the utmost' is obsolete. The law does not
require that the woman shall do more than ... all attending circumstances make reasonable
for her to do in order to manifest her opposition."). Rusk is emblematic of a trend among
courts of applying a less strict (and arguably more realistic) view of force. Joshua Dressier,
Where We Have Been, and Where We Might Be Going: Some Cautionary Reflections on
Rape Law Reform, 46 CLEV. ST. L. REv. 409, 419-20 (1998).
89 SCHULHOFER, supra note 59, at 31 (noting that the prevailing view is that most courts
still require evidence of physical resistance and consider verbal protests alone to be
insufficient, regardless of the statutory language in their state).
90 KADISH & SCHULHOFER, supra note 37, at 329.
91 ESTRICH, supra note 61, at 18-19. Resistance by the victim is especially influential on
the outcome of cases of acquaintance rape, where the victim's initial meeting with her
attacker was voluntary. Id. at 19.
92 See Dressler, supra note 88, at 420-21. But see generally Anderson, supra note 83
(arguing that the resistance requirement be revived, but that verbal resistance be given the
legal equivalence of physical resistance).
93 KADISH & SCHULHOFER, supra note 37, at 329.
[Vol. 95
EVOLUTION OF THE DEFINITION RAPE
intercourse would be treated as a crime, regardless of whether physical
force occurred.94 Some feminist scholars have long hailed such a reform as
necessary to protect the rights of victims, particularly those who know their
attacker and fear physical retaliation if they go beyond a mere verbal
assertion of nonconsent.95
The most-cited case involving the removal of force as an element of
rape is the New Jersey Supreme Court's 1992 decision in State in the
Interest of M T.S.9 6 In this case, seventeen-year-old M.T.S. was staying in
the home of fifteen-year-old C.G. and her mother.97  The nature of the
relationship between the two teenagers was in great dispute at trial, but C.G.
claimed that M.T.S. came to her bedroom very early on the morning of May
22, 1990. 9' C.G. allegedly awoke from a deep sleep to find M.T.S. on top
of her, with his penis inside of her.99 She immediately slapped M.T.S. in
the face and "told him to get off [her] and get out"; M.T.S. complied less
than a minute later.'00 M.T.S., in contrast, testified that C.G. had invited
him to her room and that the sex between them was consensual.101
However, during the act, C.G. changed her mind and pushed M.T.S. off, at
which time he immediately complied with her wishes.
10 2
The trial court found that C.G. was not sleeping at the time of the act,
and that she and M.T.S. were engaged in consensual kissing and heavy
petting; however, C.G. had not consented to intercourse. 103 M.T.S. was
convicted of second-degree sexual assault, but the appellate division
overturned, citing a lack of the element of force required to establish
rape. '(o4
94 Id. Under this regime, nonconsensual intercourse in the absence of force might be
treated either as rape or as a lesser degree of sexual assault.
95 See generally Lucy Reed Harris, Towards a Consent Standard in the Law of Rape, 43
U. CHI. L. REv. 613 (1976). "[T]he reasonable man... should be one who understands that
a woman's word is deserving of respect, whether she is a perfect stranger or his own wife."
ESTRICH, supra note 61, at 97.
96 609 A.2d 1266 (N.J. 1992).
9' Id. at 1267.
98 Id. at 1267-68.




103 Id. at 1269.
'04 In re M.T.S., 588 A.2d 1282, 1284 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1991) (noting that
"there is no crime involving the penetration of a victim who does not give consent, [unless]
there is physical force or coercion... or other statutorily-added conditions present").
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In a unanimous decision, the New Jersey Supreme Court reversed and
reinstated M.T.S.'s rape conviction. ' 5  The court reasoned that, even
though New Jersey's recently reformed rape statute included a requirement
of physical force, "physical force in excess of that inherent in the act of
sexual penetration is not required for such penetration to be unlawful.'
10 6
With the force requirement met by penetration, courts could focus on
whether the defendant reasonably believed that "the alleged victim had
freely given affirmative permission to the specific act of sexual
penetration."' 0 7 By holding that force was intrinsic to the sexual act, and
making the victim's manifestation of nonconsent the focus of its analysis,
New Jersey became the first state to effectively eliminate force as an
element of rape.'
08
The MT.S. decision met with a predictably mixed reaction. Rape
reform advocates praised the court's opinion, claiming that it "provide[d] a
historic statement of the relevance of the law of sexual assault for protecting
personal autonomy."' 0 9 However, the opinion also attracted its fair share of
critics. 110 Many focused on the dangers of mistake-of-fact regarding
consent, and argued that M T.S., and laws similar to it, unjustly punish men
for misunderstanding communications from women regarding sex-a
problem that has existed as long as there have been relationships between
the genders."
After the New Jersey decision, a few states adopted similar provisions
that allow prosecution for lesser sexual assault offenses where force is not
present." 12 This innovative approach remains the minority view, though, as
105 M.T.S., 609 A.2d at 1279-80.
106 Id. at 1277. The Court went on to state that "a person's failure to protest or resist
cannot be considered or used as justification for bodily invasion." Id. at 1279.
107 Id. at 1278.
108 Id.
109 PEGGY REEVES SANDAY, A WOMAN SCORNED: ACQUAINTANCE RAPE ON TRIAL 281
(1996); see also Mustafa K. Kasubhai, Note, Destabilizing Power in Rape: Why Consent
Theory in Rape Law is Turned on its Head, 11 WIS. WOMEN'S L.J. 37, 66 (1996) ("In raising
the significance of freely-given permission, the court appropriately legitimized the
significance of consent over the confusing doctrine of force.").
110 See Dressier, supra note 88, at 421-45. Dressler argues that the New Jersey Supreme
Court "acted as a super-legislature," redrafting the state's rape statute and inviting
disproportional punishment by treating intercourse as force. Id at 423. "[U]nder M T.S...
we have gone beyond the no-means-rape proposition to absence-of-yes means forcible rape."
Id. at 425.
111 WOMEN AND THE LAW, supra note 41, at 830 (citing Douglas N. Husak & George C.
Thomas III, Date Rape, Social Convention, and Reasonable Mistakes, 11 L. & PHIL. 95
(1992)).
112 Under Wisconsin law, first- and second-degree sexual assault requires intercourse
without the consent of the victim by use or threat of force or violence. WIs. STAT. ANN. §§
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the physical force requirement remains the law in nearly every American
jurisdiction.' 13  These efforts at reform may be isolated or may in fact
represent "the threshold of a new era in the long and painful evolution of
women's sexual autonomy."'1 4 Either way, they have helped to set the
stage for the next step in rape reform laws-the inclusion of post-
penetration withdrawal of consent within the definition of rape.
II. STATE OF THE LAW REGARDING WITHDRAWAL OF CONSENT
A discussion of the most recent changes regarding post-penetration
rape must first be placed in a historical context. The majority of states that
have heard cases on post-penetration rape have done so while reviewing the
appropriateness of jury instructions." 5 The common law rule that a woman
cannot withdraw her consent after penetration remains the majority rule." 16
However, consistent with the more general liberalization of rape laws, an
increasing number of states are revising statutes to include situations where
the woman withdraws her consent after the act of intercourse has begun.' 17
A. MAJORITY RULE
The vast majority of states still adhere to the common law principle
that once consensual intercourse begins, a man cannot be prosecuted for
rape even if the woman withdraws her consent during the act." 8 Though a
handful of state supreme courts have recognized the defendant's disregard
of withdrawal of consent as a form of sexual assault, one should not
construe these examples to mean that the majority of states accept this
change." 9 Until it is overturned, by either court decision or statute, the
majority common-law rule remains in the forty-two states that have not yet
addressed the issue. In addition, a few state courts have heard the issue of
940.225(1)-(2) (2004). However, the crime of third-degree sexual assault, a Class G felony,
does not require the use of force. § 940.225(3). Florida has enacted a similar statute,
making nonconsensual intercourse without the use of force a second-degree felony. FLA.
STAT. ANN. § 794.011(5) (2004).
113 SCHULHOFER, supra note 59, at 44.
114 SANDAY, supra note 109, at 278.
115 See discussion infra Parts II-1I.A.
116 See discussion infra Part Il.A.
17 See discussion infra Parts II.B.
118 See discussion infra Parts II.B., III (describing the only eight states that have deviated
from the common-law standard).
119 See discussion infra Parts II.B, III. The eight states that have abolished the common
law standard and expanded their definitions of rape to include post-penetration withdrawal of
consent are Alaska, California, Connecticut, Illinois, Kansas, Maine, Minnesota, and South
Dakota. See discussion infra Parts II.B, III.
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withdrawal of consent and reaffirmed the doctrine that a man cannot be
guilty of sexual assault once a woman gives her initial consent.
1. North Carolina
The North Carolina Supreme Court was the first in modem times to
consider the case of continued forced intercourse in the face of withdrawn
consent. 120  It did so in the context of a jury instruction in a rape trial
regarding withdrawn consent. 12 1 In that case the defendant, Donnie Way,
and victim, Beverly Hester, were on their first date together.122 During the
date, they went with another couple to the apartment of the defendant's
friend. 123 The victim accompanied the defendant to a bedroom, at which
time she testified that Way hit her, and she undressed "because she was
scared." 124 Beverly further testified the defendant then forced her to "have
intercourse with him even though she begged him not to because she was a
virgin. '' 25 During the act, Beverly complained of severe stomach pains,
and Way got off her and called her friend from downstairs. 26 They then
took Beverly to the hospital, where she reported she had been raped.
127
Way denied slapping Beverly and said that the couple sat in the bedroom
and talked for over thirty minutes before undressing and engaging in
consensual intercourse. 1
28
During deliberations at trial, the jury asked the judge "whether consent
can be withdrawn" and the judge responded affirmatively. 29  Way was
convicted of second-degree rape, and appealed on the grounds that the
court's instruction on withdrawal of consent was in error. 30 The North
120 State v. Way, 254 S.E.2d 760 (N.C. 1979); see also Erin G. Palmer, Note, Antiquated
Notions of Womanhood and the Myth of the Unstoppable Male: Why Post-Penetration Rape
Should be a Crime in North Carolina, 82 N.C. L. REV. 1258 (2004) (describing the Way case
at length and criticizing it in light of recent actions by other states, including John Z. and the
Illinois statute).
121 Way, 254 S.E.2d at 761.
122 Id. at 760.
123 id.
124 Id.
125 Id. at 760-61.
126 Id. at 761.
127 Id. The doctor who examined Beverly at the hospital on the night of the incident
testified that there were bruises and some swelling on her face, and that her vagina "showed
evidence of recent trauma." Id.
128 id.
129 Id. The court's instruction stated: "[C]onsent initially given could be withdrawn and
if the intercourse continued through use of force or threat of force and that the act at that
point was no longer consensual this would constitute the crime of rape." Id.
130 id.
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Carolina Supreme Court agreed with the defendant and granted him a new
trial, stating that consent may only be withdrawn between acts of
intercourse, rather than during a single act.' 3  The court went on to hold
that:
Under the court's instruction, the jury could have found the defendant guilty of rape if
they believed Beverly had consented to intercourse with the defendant and in the
middle of that act, she changed her mind. This is not the law. If the actual
penetration is accomplished with the woman's consent, the accused is not guilty of
rape, although he may be guilty of another crime because of his subsequent actions.
2. Maryland
Two years after Way, the Maryland Court of Appeals heard a case
involving a similar instruction to a jury. 33 In this case, the victim, a forty-
four year old grandmother, drove the defendant, John Battle, to his
apartment, purportedly to examine a radio that Battle had offered to sell
her. 134 When the two arrived at Battle's home, she accompanied him to his
room voluntarily, at which time the victim testified that Battle grew violent,
striking her. 135 Battle then brandished a screwdriver and held it to the
victim's head, demanding that she disrobe and join him in bed. 36 The
victim complied, and the defendant raped her. 137 The defendant told a very
different story, testifying that he found the victim naked in his bedroom and
inviting him to engage in intercourse, which he declined. 1
38
As in Way, the jury submitted a question to the judge during
deliberations: "When a possible consensual sexual relationship becomes
non-consensual for some reason, during the course of the action can the act
then be considered rape?"'139 After clarifying the jury's question, the judge
responded, in part: "it is possible for a situation to start out as consensual
31 Id. (citing R. ANDERSON, 1 WHARTON'S CRIM. L. & PROC. § 302 (1957)).
132 Id. at 761-62. But see Palmer, supra note 120, at 1269-71 (arguing that an "accurate
reading" of the North Carolina rape statute indicates that Way, or anyone who "refuses to
cease intercourse immediately after a woman withdraws consent" has committed second-
degree rape).
133 Battle v. State, 414 A.2d 1266 (Md. 1980).





139 Id. at 1268.
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and then become a non-consensual one in the course of the event."' 40 The
jury then convicted Battle of assault with intent to rape.141
The Court of Appeals considered whether the judge's instruction
confused the jury to the point that a new trial was warranted. 142 In doing so,
the court considered the history of Maryland's rape statute, which arose
from the English common law. 143 Noting the dearth of cases similar to the
situation described in the jury instruction, the court cited precedent to show
that the victim's consent (or lack of it) at the time of initial penetration is
the determining factor when analyzing if a rape has occurred. 144  For
example, when the victim originally does not consent to intercourse, but
then gives her consent after penetration, the act is still considered rape.
145
Thus, the court concluded that if a woman consents to intercourse prior to
penetration, and then withdraws her consent, no rape has occurred. 46 As
such, it held that the jury's question and judge's subsequent answer
"create[d] sufficient confusion.., to warrant reversal and remand for a new
trial."
147
3. California Appellate Court: Vela
Prior to the 2003 California Supreme Court decision in People v. John
Z., the California appellate courts were split regarding whether or not
consent could be withdrawn. 148 The case following the traditional common-
law rule, like Way and Battle, dealt with the appeal of a jury instruction
140 Id.
141 Id. at 1267.
142 Id. at 1268. While defense counsel did not specifically object on the grounds that the
judge's instruction was ambiguous, he did speculate that "what the jury thought in their
minds, I thought it was wrong ... I would say during the course of the action.., the person
cannot claim and start screaming rape." Id. The Court of Appeals found that while
counsel's response to the judge was "not as specific an objection as one might prefer ... the
sum total of his statement was to specify that the question and answer were unclear." Id.
141 Id. at 1269.
'44 Id. at 1269-70. The court cited a number of legal treatises to support its proposition,
as well as cases in Kansas, State v. Allen, 183 P.2d 458 (Kan. 1947); New Jersey, State v.
Auld, 67 A.2d 175 (N.J. 1949); and Tennessee, Wright v. State, 23 Tenn. 194 (1843); see
also Amy McLellan, Comment, Post-Penetration Rape-Increasing the Penalty, 31 SANTA
CLARA L. REV. 779, 789 (1991).
14' Battle, 414 A.2d at 1269-70. "[W]hen the offense has been made complete by
penetration, no remission by the woman or consent from her, however quickly following,
can avail the man." Id. at 1269 (quoting J. BISHOP, CRIMINAL LAW § 1122 (8th ed. 1892)).
146 Id. at 1270 ("[O]rdinarily if [the woman] consents prior to penetration and withdraws
the consent following penetration, there is no rape.").
141 Id at 1271.
148 People v. John Z., 60 P.3d 183, 185-86 (Cal. 2003).
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regarding withdrawal of consent during intercourse. 149  The court relied
heavily on the Way and Battle decisions in reaching its opinion. 5 ° The
defendant claimed that the victim initially consented to intercourse, but
changed her mind during the act and withdrew her consent. 5 ' He then
continued the act of intercourse by force and against the victim's will. 
52
The jury submitted a note during deliberations asking: "Once
penetration has occurred with the female's consent, if the female changes
her mind does force from that point (where she changes her mind)
constitute rape?"' 53 The judge responded in the affirmative, and the jury
returned a guilty verdict. 54 The Appellate Court, Fifth District conceded
that the question of post-penetration rape was one of first impression in
California, but held that the trial court's instruction to the jury was incorrect
and ordered a new trial for the defendant. 55 Citing Way and Battle, the
court opined that "the presence or absence of consent at the moment of
initial penetration appears to be the crucial point in the crime of rape."'
156
Therefore, if consent is given at the time the act begins, the act of
intercourse is "shielded from being a rape" even if the woman withdraws
her consent while the act is taking place. 1
57
The exclusion of post-penetration withdrawal of consent was, in the
view of the court, consistent with the rape statute in California.'58 The
court's reasoning was that "the essence of the crime of rape is the outrage to
the person and feelings of the female resulting from nonconsensual
violation of her womanhood."' 159 Such outrage cannot be present where a
female has willingly consented to the act of intercourse, even if she
149 People v. Vela, 218 Cal. Rptr. 161 (Cal. Ct. App. 1985), overruled by John Z., 60
P.3d at 184.
"S0 Id. at 162.
151 Id.
152 id.
153 Id. at 162-63.
154 Id. at 163. Prior to the return of the verdict, the court conducted additional research
on the question of post-penetration withdrawal of consent, concluding that its answer to the
jurors' note may have been in error. Id. After polling the jury to see if its verdict had been
based in part on the court's answer to the note, the judge asked the jury to deliberate further
as if the court had not been able to answer the question. Id. The jury again returned a
unanimous verdict of guilty. Id
115 Id. at 163, 165.
156 Id. at 164.
157 Id. The court noted that acts of force or violence during the act, while not considered
rape, could by punishable under other crimes (i.e., assault or battery). Id. at 165.
158 Id. at 164-65 (citing CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 261,263 (West 1985)).
151 Id. at 165.
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withdraws her consent during the act. 160  The Vela court's reasoning
received some criticism at the time, and was later overruled in John Z.16 1
However, it remains an important example of the view that existed at
common law and that remains the law today in over eighty percent of states.
B. MINORITY RULE
While most states have not yet addressed the issue of post-penetration
rape, many that have done so have adopted the position that their state's
rape statute included situations where consent was withdrawn during
intercourse.
1. Maine
Maine was the first state to classify intercourse that continues after
consent is withdrawn as rape. 162 In 1984, the Maine Supreme Court heard
the appeal of Gordon Robinson III from his rape conviction. 63 The victim
testified that she allowed Robinson into her home to make a phone call after
he ran out of gas, and that he then raped her. 164 Robinson, in contrast,
claimed that he and the alleged victim engaged in sexual foreplay and then
consensual intercourse before she suddenly declared: "I guess I don't want
to do this anymore."' 165 Robinson claimed that after the alleged victim made
this statement, he got dressed and left her home immediately. 166
At trial, the jury submitted a question to the judge regarding the law
governing post-penetration rape. 167 The judge responded that if one party
continues to engage in intercourse after the other has revoked her consent,
then a rape has occurred. 168 The judge stressed that "the critical element
there is the continuation under compulsion."'' 69  On appeal, the Maine
Supreme Judicial Court rejected Robinson's argument that revoked consent
160 Id. Where consent is withdrawn after penetration, "the sense of outrage to [the
woman's] person and feelings could hardly be of the same magnitude as that resulting from
an initial nonconsensual violation of her womanhood." Id.
161 See generally McLellan, supra note 144 (criticizing Vela and proposing a statute that
would ensure that rape encompasses the withdrawal of consent post-penetration).
162 State v. Robinson, 496 A.2d 1067 (Me. 1984).
163 Id.
'64 Id. at 1069.
165 Id.
166 id.
167 Id. The jury's written question stated: "Concerning the law-if two people began
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cannot transform initially consensual intercourse into rape.1 70  The court
reasoned that a definition of rape that includes withdrawn consent was
consistent with the legislative intent of the Maine rape statute.' 71 It also
issued a harsh attack on the Way decision, criticizing the North Carolina
court's "misparaphrase" of the jury instruction so as to exclude the element
of compulsion.
172
While the court's extension of the Maine rape statute to cover the trial
judge's instruction was striking, its language was pointed and very clear as
to how far it was willing to go.' 73 The court emphasized that the ongoing
intercourse, initiated with the alleged victim's consent, "did not become
rape merely because she revoked her consent., 174 Rather, a rape occurred
because of the defendant's use of forcible compulsion to make the victim
submit to continued intercourse after she withdrew consent. 175 One might
surmise that the court would not recognize as rape a situation where the
victim withdrew consent and the attacker continued, but did not use
force. 176 More recent state court decisions have relied less on force, and
more on consent, in protecting victims of nonconsensual sex.
2. Other States
Since Robinson, courts in several other states have held that their
states' rape statutes cover continued forced intercourse after consent is
withdrawn. In Connecticut, the appeals court upheld a jury instruction
similar to the one in Robinson.177 The trial judge carefully instructed the
170 Id. "The dramatic change from the role of a voluntary participant to that of a victim
compelled involuntarily to submit to the sexual intercourse is a distinct one." Id. at 1071.
171 Id. at 1069-70. The Maine statute included the elements of sexual intercourse and
forcible compulsion, both of which were present in this situation. Id. at 1069. Therefore, the
judge's instruction was factually correct. Id. at 1069-70 (citing ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 17-
A, § 252(1) (West 1983) (repealed 1989)).
172 Id. at 1070. While the trial court's jury instruction in Way included a requirement of
"force or threat of force," the North Carolina Supreme Court ignored this part of the
instruction in its analysis. Id. (citing State v. Way, 254 S.E.2d 760, 761-62 (N.C. 1979)).
The Robinson court went on to state that, in its view, the Way court "did not cite any
authority on point, and in any event erroneously stated the issue involved both there and
here." Id.
' id. at 1069-70.
114 Id. at 1070.
175 Id.
176 Since a reliance on force requires courts to use the resistance requirement, rather than
a consent standard, a situation where the woman says "no" during intercourse but does not
resist physically (out of fear, perhaps) would not be considered rape under the Maine statute
as interpreted in Robinson.




jury that continued intercourse after consent is withdrawn is only rape if it
is accompanied by force. 178  The court found that the Connecticut rape
statute, which read that "penetration, however slight [is sufficient] to
complete... intercourse" should not be construed to mean that the act of
penetration concludes intercourse. 179 Thus, it rejected the notion, espoused
by the Maryland court in Battle, that consent at penetration is equivalent to
consent for the entire act. 180 Unconvinced by any of the decisions made in
other states regarding the issue, the court resolved the issue "on the basis of
[its] own best judgment" by stating that "if intercourse is without consent
and accomplished through force, it constitutes sexual assault.'
181
Prior to 2003, three other state courts issued similar decisions
involving jury instructions that interpreted their states' rape statutes to
include post-penetration withdrawal of consent. 18 2  In South Dakota, the
State Supreme Court upheld a trial judge's decision to refuse a defendant's
proposed jury instruction that was based on the Vela decision in
California. 183 Minnesota adopted the position that rape includes forcible
continuation of sexual intercourse after consent is withdrawn when its
Court of Appeals upheld a trial court judge's jury instruction to that
effect. 184 Finally, and more recently, the Court of Appeals of Alaska upheld
a similar trial court instruction, making it the fifth state in the nation to
adopt the minority view.'
85
178 Id. at 961 n.3. The trial judge's answer to a previous question by the jury was "no,"
based on the omission of any reference to force within the question. Id. While the inclusion
of a force requirement implies that the court may have been closely following the Robinson
decision, the court cautioned that "the reasoning of the Maine court, while appealing, reflects
in part that state's statutes, which are not identical to our own." Id. at 963 (citing Robinson,
496 A.2d at 1070).
179 Id. at 962 (citing CONN. GEN. STAT. § 53a-65(2) (1984)).
180 See Battle v. State, 414 A.2d, 1266, 1269-70 (Md. 1980).
81 Siering, 644 A.2d. at 963. The court found the Maryland court's discussion in Battle
to be dicta, the North Carolina court's analysis in Way to be "merely a bald statement that
the trial court was wrong," and the Vela court's reasoning to be "archaic and unrealistic." Id.
182 McGill v. State, 18 P.3d 77 (Alaska Ct. App. 2001); State v. Crims, 540 N.W.2d 860
(Minn. Ct. App. 1995), cert. denied, No. CI-95-304, C6-95-41 (Minn. 1996); State v. Jones,
521 N.W.2d 662, 672 (S.D. 1984).
183 Jones, 521 N.W.2d at 672 ("This court has never held that initial consent forecloses a
rape prosecution and, based on the facts of this case, we choose not to adopt the position of
the Vela case.").
184 Crims, 540 N.W.2d at 865. The court favorably cited the Maine, Connecticut, and
South Dakota decisions and held that this rule was consistent with Minnesota's rape statutes.
Id.
181 McGill, 18 P.3d at 84. In rejecting McGill's arguments, the court interpreted the
state's statutes as not limiting "sexual penetration" to the initial moment of penetration. Id.
Additionally, the court stated that "nothing in the legislative history of our statute supports
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3. California Appellate Court: Roundtree
When the California Supreme Court decided John Z. in 2003, it did so
in part to resolve a split between the Vela court and another appellate court
that found the opposite result in a similar case a full fifteen years later after
Vela. 8 6 In the 2000 case, the defendant brought a 15-year-old runaway,
Jennifer, to a carport in an apartment complex in which he claimed his sister
lived.187 Jennifer alleged that the defendant ripped her clothes off and, over
her cries of"no," beat and raped her.' 88 She stayed with him overnight, and
told her mother the next day that she had been raped.18 9 Roundtree claimed
that the two had consensual sex during which Jennifer grew angry and told
him to stop.1 90
Responding to a jury question, the trial court stated that if all other
elements of rape are present, "the fact that there was a prior penetration
with the consent of the female does not negate rape." 19 1 The First District
Appellate Court upheld the instruction, explicitly rejecting Vela's
conclusion as "unsound" and declining to follow it.1 92 Vela's focus on "the
moment of penetration as the crucial moment of the crime of rape" was "not
the question presented in Vela nor is it the issue presented here."' 93 Rather,
under the relevant California statute, a rape occurs if the victim removes
consent and is forced to continue with intercourse against her will.
194
Roundtree also criticized the Vela court's assertion that continued forcible
intercourse after a woman withdraws consent is somehow less of an outrage
to the woman than intercourse without consent at penetration.'
1 95
Roundtree created an appellate division split in California. The State
Supreme Court addressed the split in 2003, which became a groundbreaking
year of state reform of post-penetration rape policies. 1
96
McGill's argument that once a person is sexually penetrated with consent, that consent
cannot be withdrawn." Id.
186 See discussion of Vela supra Part II.A.3; People v. Roundtree, 91 Cal. Rptr. 2d 921
(Cal. Ct. App. 2000).
187 Roundtree, 91 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 922.
188 Id.
189 Id.
190 Id. at 923.
191 Id.
192 Id. at 924.
193 Id. at 924-25 (quoting People v. Vela, 218 Cal. Rptr. 161 (Cal. Ct. App. 1985)).
194 Id. at 925.
195 Id. at 924 ("The statutory requirements of the offense [of rape] are met as the act of
sexual intercourse is forcibly accomplished against the victim's will. The outrage to the
victim is complete. That the victim initially consented to the act is not determinative.").




III. METHODS OF CHANGE
As with any reform in the law, there are two primary ways in which
change can take place: judicial action and legislative statute. The year 2003
began with five states explicitly including, within the meaning of their rape
statutes, the act of continued forced intercourse after the victim withdraws
consent.' 97 It ended with one state adopting this position by a landmark
State Supreme Court decision, a second issuing a similar opinion, and a
third embracing the change through legislative action.'
98
A. CHANGE THROUGH THE COURTS: CALIFORNIA
The case of the minor John Z. allowed the California Supreme Court to
address an inconsistency among its appellate courts in this emerging area of
sexual assault policy.' 99 The court seized the opportunity, and in its opinion
went into greater depth than any other court regarding a woman's right to
withdraw her consent during intercourse.200 John was convicted for forcible
rape in the trial court, and in his appeal made several arguments that his
conviction should be overturned. These included: (1) a reliance on the
Vela court's "outrage theory"; (2) a newly-minted "primal urge" theory; and
(3) a mistake-of-fact defense based on a purported lack of evidence that
Laura, the victim in the case, had manifested a lack of consent. All seven
members of the court rejected the first argument, while the other two
attracted the support of the lone dissenting justice in the case.20'
1. Outrage Theory
First, John relied on the reasoning of the state appellate court in Vela,
claiming that "a consensual beginning to sexual intercourse does in fact
alter the complexion of the act, thus differentiating it from an act of sexual
intercourse where the female never consented., 20 2 John adopted the Vela
court's argument that the sense of personal outrage a woman feels when she
has initially consented to the act cannot possibly match that of a victim
197 See discussion supra Part II.B.
198 See discussion infra.
199 People v. John Z., 60 P.3d 183, 184 (Cal. 2003); see discussion of John Z. facts supra
Introduction.
200 John Z., 60 P.3d at 183. The John Z. case is also notable because it was the first time
any court had approached the post-penetration rape issue directly from the facts of a case,
rather than through the instrument of a jury instruction. Id.
201 See generally id. at 183-91.
202 App. Brief, supra note 3, at 9.
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where intercourse begins without consent.20 3  Since rape is essentially a
crime of outrage, this argument reasons, continued intercourse where
consent is initially given, and then taken away, can at most be considered
some lesser form of sexual assault, but certainly not rape as defined under
the California Penal Code.2 °4
The court responded to the "outrage theory" argument by totally
repudiating Vela, characterizing its reasoning (as well as that of both Way
and Battle) as "unsound., 20 5 The court noted that it is fruitless for a judicial
body to assume varying levels of outrage among victims of different types
of forced intercourse. 20 6 Even more significantly, no California case, either
before or after Vela, had ever held that the level of outrage suffered by the
victim was an element of rape.20 7 By hinging their reasoning on such a
tenet, both the defendant in John Z. and the Vela court on which he relied in
his appeal sealed their own fates.208
2. "Primal Urge" Theory
Perhaps sensing the flawed reasoning of Vela, John next formulated an
argument using the language of Roundtree, which, at the time, stood in
direct conflict with Vela.2°9 John argued that Roundtree implied that courts
must adopt a "reasonable amount of time" measure into the analysis of the
203 Id. (quoting People v. Vela, 218 Cal. Rptr. 161, 164-165 (Cal. Ct. App. 1985), rev'd
John Z., 60 P.3d at 183).
204 App. Brief, supra note 3, at 9 (citing CAL. PENAL CODE § 263 (2003)). "Our
conclusion that no rape occurs under these circumstances does not preclude the perpetrator
from being found guilty of another crime or crimes warranted by the evidence." Vela, 218
Cal. Rptr. at 165.
205 John Z., 60 P.3d at 186.
206 Id. ("Contrary to Vela's assumption, we have no way of accurately measuring the
level of outrage the victim suffers from being subjected to continued forcible intercourse
following withdrawal of her consent. We must assume the sense of outrage is substantial.").
Observers have noted that the rule advocated by both John and the Vela court "equates the
harm of rape with penetration alone and ignores the loss of sexual freedom that occurs when
a woman is forced to continue a sexual encounter against her will." Martha Chamallas,
Consent, Equality, and the Legal Control of Sexual Conduct, 61 S. CAL. L. REv. 777, 816-17
(1988).
207 John Z., 60 P.3d at 186. Further, nothing in the California rape statute makes the
degree of the victim's outrage a condition for the crime of rape. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 261
(2003); cf Palmer, supra note 120, at 169 (criticizing the Way court and observing that
"[a]lthough outrage and suffering by victims are significant and valid reasons for punishing
rapists, they are not essential elements of the crime of rape in North Carolina").
208 However, it should be noted the so-called "outrage theory" was allowed to stand for
eighteen years as a basis for legitimizing forced intercourse after a victim withdraws her
consent.
209 App. Brief, supra note 3, at 12.
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alleged sexual assault.2" ° In order to convict a man of post-penetration rape,
a court would determine whether he stopped intercourse within a reasonable
amount of time after the woman withdrew her consent. 21  As this would be
very difficult for a court to gauge, the rule that the State of California
advocated against John was unworkable. 1 2 John argued:
Sexual intercourse ... is not a mechanical act that can be immediately started and
immediately stopped by the turning of an ignition or a switch. It is a living act. When
a female initially consents to sexual intercourse and allows a male to penetrate her,
she causes certain consequences to occur.. .a male's primal urge to reproduce is
aroused.... It is only natural, fair, and just that a male be given a reasonable amount
of time in which to quell his primal urge, which was originally consensually invoked,
upon withdrawal of a female's consent. 
13
John further claimed that the sixty to ninety seconds it took for him to cease
intercourse after Laura withdrew her consent constituted such a reasonable
214
amount of time.
The court rejected John's "primal urge" theory, citing a complete lack
of any supporting authority.2 15 Further, the court found the argument
contrary to the state's rape statute, which contains no language that
"suggests that the defendant is entitled to persist in intercourse once his
victim withdraws her consent., 216 Even so, the record suggests that John
had "ample time" to withdraw after Laura's protests, but chose not to do
SO.2 17 Thus, John's reasonable time, or "primal urge" argument failed.21 8
The majority declined the opportunity to issue instructional language
to other courts as to what might be a reasonable amount of time for a man
to end intercourse after the woman withdraws consent.219 This lack of
210 Id. (citing People v. Roundtree, 91 Cal. Rptr. 2d 921, 924 (Cal. Ct. App. 2000))
(criticizing the lack of specificity in Roundtree's rule that "rape therefore is necessarily
committed when a victim withdraws her consent during sexual intercourse but is forced to
complete the act").
211 Id. at 12.
212 id.
213 Id. at 11-12 (emphasis added).
214 Id. at 14.
215 People v. John Z., 60 P.3d 183, 187 (Cal. 2003).
216 Id. (citing CAL. PENAL CODE § 261(a)(2) (2003)).
217 Id. The court noted that Laura repeated her admonition that she "had to go home"
three times, with John ignoring her pleas each time. Id. The court determined that John
"continued the sex act for at least four or five minutes after Laurafirst told him she had to go
home," and that after her third plea John continued to force sex on her "for about a 'minute,
minute and [a] half.' Id.
218 Id.
219 Id. at 187-88. In choosing not to issue a holding regarding a specific time period that
might be "reasonable," the court cited both the nature of the case (a juvenile adjudication,
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specificity met with harsh criticism from the dissent.220 "The majority...
does not tell us how soon would have been soon enough. Ten seconds?
Thirty? A minute? Is persistence the same thing as force? ' 22 ' The
difficulty of choosing a particular amount of time between withdrawal of
consent and termination of intercourse is one popular criticism of the
California decision and like cases.222
3. Evidence of Withdrawal of Consent
John's final argument relied on the facts of his case, rather than legal
theory. Here, he made a basic mistake-of-fact argument, claiming that even
if the California statute covered post-penetration rape, the state failed to
provide sufficient evidence that the victim, Laura, actually withdrew her
consent.223
Chief Justice Janice Rogers Brown, in dissent, focused on what she
perceived to be a shaky manifestation of nonconsent by the victim. In her
analysis of what she termed a "sordid, distressing, sad little case," Chief
Justice Brown agreed with the much of the majority's legal analysis.2 24 For
example, she admitted that "after intercourse has commenced, [a woman]
has the absolute right to call a halt and say 'no more' and if she is
compelled to continue, a forcible rape is committed. 22 5  However, she
argued that in this particular case, the prosecution did not show beyond a
reasonable doubt that Laura's actions and words constituted an unequivocal
withdrawal of consent.2 26 Further, even if Laura did withdraw her consent,
the state did not show that John continued the act with force after that
rather than a jury trial) and the fact that the briefs did not address the issue of a particular
time period. Id.
220 Id. at 190 (Brown, C.J., dissenting).
221 Id. (Brown, C.J., dissenting).
222 Supporters of the John Z decision praise this approach, arguing that this is a question
of fact for a jury to determine and any attempt by a court or legislature to codify a period of
time as unreasonable is "the same thing as saying a little bit of rape is okay." Interview with
Wendy Murphy, Victim Advocacy & Research Group, supra note 54; see also discussion
supra Part IV.A. 1.
223 App. Brief, supra note 3, at 13-14. John conceded in his brief that Laura "expressly
withdrew her consent after ... eight and a half to nine minutes." Id. However, he also noted
that "the evidence demonstrates that Laura is an outgoing, conversational, independent and
sexually experienced person. There is no evidence that she is shy, easily dominated or
unable to perceive a situation at face value." Id. at 12.
224 John Z., 60 P.3d at 189 (Brown, C.J., dissenting).
225 Id. at 188 (Brown, C.J., dissenting).
226 Id. at 190 ("Laura's silent and ineffectual movements could easily be misinterpreted.
And, none of her statements are unequivocal.") (Brown, C.J., dissenting)..
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point.227 As such, the state did not prove John's guilt beyond a reasonable
doubt.228
The majority responded to the claims of both John and Chief Justice
Brown by emphasizing the facts in the record.229  Laura physically
struggled with John even when she was on top of him, and asserted her
need to go home three separate times, yet John continued the act.230 As
such, "no reasonable person in defendant's position would have believed
that Laura continued to consent in the act.",23' Further, John exerted force
over Laura that was "clearly ample" to satisfy the level of force necessary
for conviction under the state's rape statute.232 Since John should have
known that Laura withdrew her consent, but instead ignored her pleas and
continued the act with force, he was guilty of the crime of rape.233
4. Kansas: Another Change Through the Courts
Since the John Z. opinion, a seventh state, Kansas, has adopted the
position that forced continuance of sexual intercourse after a victim
withdraws her consent constitutes rape. 234 This case once again offered
conflicting testimony by the two parties involved, with the woman claiming
that she was the victim of acquaintance rape and the man testifying that the
woman was a consensual participant until after penetration occurred. 235 The
defendant looked to both Battle and the (now vacated) Vela decision to
argue that the encounter was not rape, citing the common-law rule that
"rape occurs at the time of initial penetration, or not at all."236
227 Id. (Brown, C.J., dissenting). The Chief Justice stressed that, like in the other states
that have adopted this reform, force is still a requirement of the California rape statute,
regardless of when consent is withdrawn: "[S]exual intercourse is not transformed into rape
merely because a woman changes her mind." Id. (Brown, C.J., dissenting).
228 Id. (Brown, C.J., dissenting).
219 Id. at 185-87.
230 Id. The court declined to mention that Laura had just been raped by John's friend
Juan mere minutes before their encounter. This may certainly have had some effect on
Laura's ability to manifest her nonconsent, regardless of her "outgoing" nature. See supra
text accompanying notes 8-11; see also Robert Greene, Confusion Over Consent, L.A.
WEEKLY NEWS, Nov. 21-27, 2003, at http://www.laweekly.com/ink/03/53/features-
greene.php (noting that the majority "makes a point of describing Juan's rape").
231 John Z., 60 P.3d at 187.
232 Id. (citing CAL. PENAL CODE § 261(a)(2) (2003); People v. Mom, 96 Cal. Rptr. 2d 172
(Cal. 2000)). The level of force required is "substantially different from or substantially
greater than that necessary to accomplish the rape itself." John Z, 60 P.3d at 187.
233 id.
234 State v. Bunyard, 75 P.3d 750 (Kan. Ct. App. 2003).
235 Id. at 754-55.
236 Id. at 755-56.
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The Kansas Court of Appeals was unmoved, and found that such a
definition would lead to a "tortuous interpretation" of the Kansas rape
statute.237 Further, it rejected the defendant's "reasonable time" argument,
and adopted the rule that "when consent is withdrawn, continuing sexual
intercourse for five to ten minutes is not reasonable and constitutes rape. 238
The Kansas court thus went a step further than any other court, including
the California court in John Z., by delineating a specific time period as
unreasonable.239
B. CHANGE THROUGH STATUTE: ILLINOIS
While courts in seven states now interpret their rape laws to include
consent withdrawn during intercourse, only one state has codified this
change through statute. In late January 2003, soon after the John Z. opinion
was issued, the office of State Senator Dan Rutherford (R-Pontiac)
contacted the Illinois Coalition Against Sexual Assault (ICASA) to enlist
their support for a bill he planned to introduce in the Illinois Senate.24°
Senator Rutherford's learned of the John Z. case and felt that, in order to
avoid split appellate courts and a prolonged legal battle in Illinois, the
legislature should act to clarify the state's law immediately.241
Sen. Rutherford introduced SB 406, the so-called "No Means No" Act,
which added a new section to the Illinois rape statute that read: "A person
who initially consents to sexual penetration or sexual conduct is not deemed
to have consented to any sexual penetration or sexual conduct that occurs
after he or she withdraws consent during the course of that sexual
penetration or sexual conduct.' '242 Sen. Rutherford undertook a significant
public relations effort throughout the state, and found a high-ranking
member of his party to introduce a companion bill in the State House of
Representatives.243
237 Id. at 756 ("Quite simply, sexual intercourse performed when one participant is under
force or fear is rape. It does not matter if the force or fear exists at the initiation of the act or
whether it comes after consent is withdrawn. The act is rape under either circumstance.").
238 Id.
239 id.
240 Telephone Interview with Sean Black, Communications Director, Illinois Coalition
Against Sexual Assault (Dec. 30, 2003) [hereinafter Interview with Sean Black, ICASA].
241 Id.; Telephone Interview with Dan Rippy, Staff Member, Office of State Senator Dan
Rutherford (Mar. 9, 2004) [hereinafter Interview with Dan Rippy, Sen. Rutherford's Office].
242 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/12-17(c) (2004).
243 Interview with Sean Black, ICASA, supra note 240. The initial sponsor in the Illinois
House was Rep. Rosemary Mulligan (R-Des Plaines). Senator Rutherford argued that the
new bill was not so much a change in the law, but a clarification, designed to avoid a circuit
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Although the bill attracted some critics, it was signed into law by
Governor Rod Blagojevich with relatively little accompanying fanfare on
July 24, 2003.244 Thus, Illinois became the only state to pass a statute
explicitly protecting the rights of women to withdraw their consent at any
time during sexual intercourse.245
No state had similar legislation pending during 2003 or the early part
of 2004.246 However, the media attention given to the John Z. case, the
Illinois statute, and the now-aborted Kobe Bryant trial makes it possible, if
247not likely, that a number of state legislatures may introduce such statutes.
Critics of the statutory approach vow to fight further efforts to reform the
law through this method, and were successful in derailing legislation in
California similar to that which passed in Illinois.245 However, activism by
state legislatures on this issue would be welcomed, because changes via the
legislative process are needed to legitimize the policy and avoid delay in its
implementation.249
IV. RESPONSE TO CRITICS OF THE REFORM
The attention showered on this issue by feminists, legal scholars, and
the media at large has been both positive and negative. Many victims'
advocates groups responded to the actions with praise. The National Crime
Victim Law Institute hailed the John Z. decision as "modern and
progressive," and stated that it "means that a woman has complete control
over her sexual activity. 250 In addition, ICASA Executive Director Polly
Poskin supported the passage of the SB 406 in Illinois as "an important step
split such as the one that had occurred in California. Interview with Dan Rippy, Sen.
Rutherford's Office, supra note 241.
244 Interview with Sean Black, ICASA, supra note 240; see Wendy McElroy, Law Needs
New Category of Sexual Assault, at http://www.ifeminists.net/introduction/editorials/
2003/0819.html (Aug. 19, 2003) [hereinafter New Category]; see also discussion of criticism
of the statutory approach, supra Part IV.B.
245 Interview with Sean Black, ICASA, supra note 240. Douglas Baloof, head of the
National Crime Victim Law Institute, stated that he believed the Illinois statute was "the first
of its kind in the country." New Illinois Rape Law Protects People Who Change Mind
During Sex, Fox NEWS, available at www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,93245,00.html (last
accessed Sept. 27, 2003).
246 Interview with Sean Black, ICASA, supra note 240.
247 Id.; Alex Markels, The Rape Disconnect, L.A. WEEKLY NEWS, Oct. 24, 2003,
available at http://www.laweekly.com/ink/03/49/newsmarkels.php.
248 Telephone interview with Mary Beth Carter, Executive Director, California Coalition
Against Sexual Assault (Feb. 27, 2004) [hereinafter Interview with Mary Beth Carter,
CALCASA]; see discussion of criticism of the statutory approach, infra Part IV.B.
249 See discussion supra Part IV.B.
250 Maura Dolan, Ruling Expands Scope of Rape, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 7, 2003, at B1.
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in recognizing the rights of women to control their own bodies and ensure
their safety. '51
However, the verdict of public opinion regarding these changes in the
law is far from unanimous, and the vitriol with which critics have
responded to the California and Illinois actions identifies potential problems
with the policy. 252  Some critics target the entire policy, while others
support the reforms but favor a particular method of implementation. 53
However, the need for change exists, and legislatures, as well as the
judiciary, should both position themselves to enact these reforms while
attention is focused on them.254
A. GENERAL CRITICISMS OF THE REFORM
Critics of the post-penetration rape laws have three major complaints:
(1) the reform creates an unworkable rule because it is impossible to define
a "reasonable" time for the partner to stop after the women withdraws her
consent; (2) the reform victimizes men; and (3) the reform trivializes the
harm done to those women who are victims of "actual" rapes.
1. The Reform is Ambiguous and Unworkable
The first group of critics argues that the reform creates a vague
mandate that is impossible for men, and even women, to follow.255 This
difficulty is twofold: it is hard for the man to know both if the woman has
withdrawn her consent and when to stop if he feels the consent has been
withdrawn.256 Once a woman agrees to sexual intercourse and the act
begins, it may become difficult for a man to determine if she withdraws her
consent.257 In addition, since no court has adopted an explicit "reasonable"
251 Press Release, Illinois Coalition Against Sexual Assault, ICASA Supports "No Means
No" Legislation (Feb. 10, 2003), available at http://www.icasa.org/uploads/
no-means no.doc.
252 See discussion infra Part IV.
253 See discussion infra Part IV.B.
254 Id.
255 This argument flows naturally from Chief Justice Brown's dissent in John Z., in
which she speculated that John may have had a reasonable belief that Laura did not waive
her consent. Specifically, John could have viewed the words "I have to go home" as
"requests for reassurance or demands for speed." People v. John Z., 60 P.3d 183, 190 (Cal.
2003) (Brown, C.J., dissenting).
256 Id.; see also Greene, supra note 230 ("Did Laura, having just been raped by John Z.'s
friend, really consent? Did she really revoke consent later, or was she just seeking some
reassurance from John? Or telling him to hurry up?").
257 See, e.g., Debra Saunders, Not As She Does, at http://www.townhall.com/colunmists/
debrasaunders/ds20030114.shtml. (Jan. 14, 2003) (arguing that John Z. and like opinions
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time, men have no guidance as to the time the law will allow them after
withdrawal of consent to cease the sexual act.
258
Certainly, the adoption of a rule that includes withdrawal of consent
during intercourse within the definition of rape adds an element to the
adjudication of rape cases that did not previously exist. However, juries are
fully capable of applying the facts of a case to their state's rape statute and
determining whether a defendant violated the law. 259 The fact that consent
is withdrawn before, rather than after penetration does not affect the basic
fact-finding role that trial courts have played for centuries.260 Additionally,
this function will be unaffected whether the change in the law occurs
through judicial or legislative activism.26 1
The question as to whether courts or legislatures should implement a
"reasonable" time after which a male must withdraw is slightly more
complicated. Certainly, both courts and state legislatures could adopt
specific guidelines as to the time a male has to cease intercourse after the
female's manifestation of nonconsent. 262 It would not be the first time a
legislature or judicial body has set a specific time to an action to prevent
violation of a constitutional right.2 63 However, critics are persuasive when
they decry attempts by either courts or legislatures to codify a particular
mean that girls will believe in a "fairytale world without consequences" that is "not
realistic").
258 See John Z., 60 P.3d at 190 (Brown, C.J., dissenting); see also Note, Acquaintance
Rape and Degrees of Consent: "No" Means "No, " But What Does "Yes" Mean?, 117
HARV. L. REv. 2341, 2363 (2004) [hereinafter Aquaintance Rape] ("The vagueness of the
persistence element of postpenetration rape illustrates the uneasiness with which it sits as a
proxy for force.").
259 John Z., 60 P.3d at 185. In John Z., six members of the California Supreme Court
upheld the trial court's decision that John's actions constituted rape. Id.
260 The question remains as to the standard trial courts should use to determine whether
the defendant's actions were "reasonable." Some would promote an objective standard that
focuses on whether a reasonable defendant would find that the victim had asserted her lack
of consent. See SCHULHOFER, supra note 59, at 22. Others would argue that a subjective test
focusing on the victim's state of mind is more appropriate. Interview with Wendy Murphy,
Victim Advocacy & Research Group, supra note 54. Courts will still face this choice
whether or not they adopt the proposed reform that includes post-penetration rape; as such,
this is a debate for another forum.
261 See infra Part IV.B.
262 While no court has identified a reasonable time within which a man must end
intercourse if his partner withdraws her consent, the Kansas Court of Appeals did hold that
more than five minutes between manifestation of nonconsent and cessation of the act was
unreasonable, and thus constituted rape. State v. Bunyard, 75 P.3d 750, 756 (Kan. Ct. App.
2003); see supra text accompanying notes 237-39.
263 See, e.g., United States v. Banks, 540 U.S. 31 (2003) (holding unanimously that a
delay of fifteen to twenty seconds between a warning knock and entrance into an apartment
was a sufficient period to preserve defendant's Fourth Amendment rights).
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period of time as "reasonable," and would leave the decision to the jury in
each individual case.264 Due to the complex nature of the circumstances
surrounding post-penetration rape, this case-by-case analysis is clearly
preferable to a per se approach that defines an explicit unit of time as
"reasonable."
B. THE REFORM VICTIMIZES MEN
Accompanying claims that the reform creates an ambiguous rule is a
not-so-subtle allegation that this reform is a next step in an ongoing
"victimization" of men in our society.265 Some critics argue that this proves
the prosecution of rape in this country is now "skewed against men," and
''men may well be advised to keep a stopwatch as well as contraceptives by
the bedside. 2 66 One well-known and nationally-syndicated conservative
columnist described this undeserved punishment of men by the courts as
follows:
I'm sorry, but when did girls get so stupid? In the old days-when girls were
apparently both smarter and tougher-a girl who didn't want to have sex didn't have
sex. She said no thanks, grabbed her purse and walked out the door. The boy may
have been disappointed and frustrated, but he wasn't confused. "No" meant "no."
And "yes" meant yes to the finish line.
267
This rationale is fundamentally insulting to men. It smacks of the
"primal urge" argument raised by the defense in John Z. and rejected by all
268seven members of the California Supreme Court. Men are just as capable
as women of acting rationally during sexual intercourse, and of knowing
exactly when sex crosses the line from a consensual act to an act of force.
269
"The minute we start to believe [otherwise] is the minute we begin to
deprive our sons, and our daughters, the opportunity for a healthy, safe and
264 Interview with Wendy Murphy, Victim Advocacy & Research Group, supra note 54;
see supra note 222.
265 See generally Parker, supra note 2; Wendy McElroy, When is it Rape?, at
www.ifeminists.net/introduction/editorials/2003/0114.html (Jan. 14, 2003).
266 McElroy, supra note 244.
267 Parker, supra note 2, at G3.
268 See discussion supra Part III.A.1.
269 See Cathy Young, Troubling Questions About Rape and Consent, BOSTON GLOBE,
Jan. 20, 2003, at A 15 ("No less disturbing is the suggestion that a healthy red-blooded male
can't control himself under the circumstances. Believe it or not, men as well as women can
change their minds during sex."); see also Palmer, supra note 120, at 1276-77 (describing
this "myth of the unstoppable male" as "insulting to men and frightening for women who
expect personal sexual autonomy and the right to bodily integrity").
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rewarding life: both as individuals and as partners., 270  The act of
penetration does not transform the male into an animal, incapable of self-
control, any more than it changes the female's status from an equal and
willing partner to one who exists solely to "quell" the male's "primal
urge. 271
3. The Reform Trivializes Victims of "Real Rape"
A third argument, raised occasionally by feminists generally
supportive of liberalizing rape laws, states that a woman who sends a man
"jumbled signals" should not have the same protection of the law as a
woman "who is brutally beaten into sexual submission., 272 These critics
suggest that forced sexual intercourse that begins as a consensual act should
fall into some lesser category of sexual assault, but not rape.273 Other
feminists have expressed a concern that the definition of rape will continue
to shift until it includes not just unwanted sex, but also so-called "bad
sex."
274
These critics map out an argument that is markedly similar to the
"outrage theory" put forward by the Vela court, briefed by John's lawyers,
and dismissed by the California court in its landmark 2003 opinion.2 75 Each
state passing this reform has reiterated that the crime of rape simply
involves intercourse, performed by force and without the partner's
consent. 2 76 In other words, where consent is withdrawn, force remains, and
intercourse continues, there is rape, regardless of when that consent is
withdrawn.277 Additionally, there exists no empirical proof that rape by a
stranger is any more harmful to women than rape at the hands of someone
270 Maggie Thurs, Men Deserve Better, at http://www.vtnetwork.org/newsletter/2003_04/
cal supreme court.html (last accessed Sept. 27, 2003).
271 See App. Brief, supra note 3, at 11-12; supra Part III.A.2.
272 McElroy, supra note 244.
273 id.
Rape must not be trivialized; it should remain the violent act of taking sex through force or threat
of force. Sexual contact that begins with consent and ends as unwelcome is simply in a different
category than rape. If a new legal category or theory is required to address the situation of
withdrawn consent, then it should be created. But the brutal crime of rape should not be diluted
in the process.
Id.
274 See generally KATIE ROIPHE, THE MORNING AFTER: SEX, FEAR AND FEMINISM ON
CAMPUS (1994).
275 See supra Parts II.A.3, III.A. 1; John Z., 60 P.3d at 186.
276 See discussion supra Parts IIB, Ill.A; see also John Z., 60 P.3d at 190 (Brown, C.J.,
dissenting).
277 See discussion supra Parts IIB, III.A.
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who was at one time a trusted partner.278 To suggest that post-penetration
rape is any less outrageous than so-called "real rape" is an affront to the
bodily integrity of women, and hearkens back to the pre-reform era in
which the cries of countless victims were ignored.
B. REFORM BY STATUTE DIMINISHES WOMEN'S RIGHTS
Some victims' rights advocates raise an additional concern regarding
reform by statute, claiming that the laws such as the one passed in Illinois
actually do more harm than good to the rights of victims. Indeed, this
argument created the only political obstacle that advocates of the Illinois
statute faced as they lobbied on behalf of the bill.279
The most outspoken critic of the Illinois statute has been Wendy
Murphy, the director of the Victim Advocacy and Research Group in
Boston., 280 The basic premise of Ms. Murphy's argument is that women's
rights against post-penetration rape are grounded in the Constitution's
protections of freedom, bodily integrity, and personal autonomy.2 l
Codifying these basic rights, under the guise of freedom, actually does
women a disservice, because the rights are no longer guaranteed but are
instead subject to the whims of the legislative process.282 As such, it is
crucial that advocates for the reform of rape laws avoid the temptation for a
legislative "quick fix" and instead seek change through the courts.
283
278 Interview with Wendy Murphy, Victim Advocacy & Research Group, supra note 54.
In fact, some scholars believe that psychological damage is even more significant where
victims are raped by trusted male partners or acquaintances, rather than strangers. See
JENNIFER J. FREYD, BETRAYAL TRAUMA: THE LOGIC OF FORGETTING CHILDHOOD ABUSE 190
(1996) (arguing that "the greater the intimacy... between the rapist and the adult victim, the
more knowledge isolation and forgetting" suffered by the victim).
279 Interview with Sean Black, ICASA, supra note 240. This argument also led to the
rejection of similar legislation in California. Interview with Mary Beth Carter, CALCASA,
supra note 248. But see Interview with Dan Rippy, Sen. Rutherford's Office, supra note 241
(stating that the senator's office was "not aware of anyone lobbying against" SB 406).
280 Bean, supra note 27 ('You shouldn't have to codify basic principles of human
rights, which is what rape laws are all about,' [Murphy] said. 'You should never put it
into legislation that people have a right to change their mind.'); Interview with Wendy
Murphy, Victim Advocacy & Research Group, supra note 54.
281 Interview with Wendy Murphy, Victim Advocacy & Research Group, supra note 54.
This approach has also been adopted by the California Coalition Against Sexual Assault.
CALCASA's Executive Director, Mary Beth Carter, notes that while it is positive that
legislatures are recognizing the importance of the issue, it is crucial that the inclusion of
withdrawal of consent in state rape statutes be effected in a way that protects women's
constitutional rights. Interview with Mary Beth Carter, CALCASA, supra note 248.




The criticism of the Illinois statute by victims' advocacy groups makes
sound legal sense. However, to ensure public acceptance of this potentially
controversial change in rape law, it is crucial that both courts and
legislatures take ownership of the reform process. First, dependence on the
courts risks reversal of the growing public support for rape law reform if the
public perceives that the courts have overreached.284  One need only
observe two of the most divisive social issues of the present day, abortion
rights and homosexual marriage, for examples of a legislative backlash to
judicial directives that go beyond the realm of public opinion.285 It is also
worth noting that, while the John Z. opinion created a fury of media
attention, the Illinois statute was signed into law to little public response.286
Even more importantly, wholesale rejection of statutory reform would
ensure that this needed change in state rape statutes would come later,
rather than sooner. Even supporters of the judicial method of reform
11287acknowledge that the reforms would be a "very long-term process.
Since current public attention to the issue might spark a series of legislative
reforms, similar to those that removed or revised the marital rape exemption
in nearly all states, the price of inaction could potentially be very high.288
Presently, the reform has taken hold in only eight jurisdictions out of fifty-
one; until the other forty-two states and the District of Columbia act to the
contrary, the common law rule regarding withdrawal of consent during
intercourse remains good law for a majority of American women. 289
Inaction on the issue is the most dangerous course for victims of sexual
284 See, e.g., Charles Krauthammer, Courts Should Stay Out of the Gay Marriage Arena,
CHI. TRIBUNE, Mar. 1, 2004, at A23.
285 Even some ardent supporters of the Supreme Court's opinion in Roe v. Wade, 410
U.S. 113 (1973), note that it reversed a trend in the early 1970s of expansion of women's
rights by state legislatures. Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Some Thoughts on Autonomy & Equality
in Relation to Roe v. Wade, 63 N.C. L. REV. 375, 381 (1985) (noting that the "sweep and
detail of [Roe] stimulated the mobilization of a right-to-life movement and an attendant
reaction in Congress and state legislatures"). The country may currently be witnessing a
similar phenomenon with gay marriage. See Scott Lindlaw, Bush Defends Gay Marriage
Prohibition, CHI. TRIBUNE, Feb. 27, 2004, available at http://www.chicagotribune.com/
news/nationworld/sns-ap-bush-gay-marriage, 1,3213988.story (quoting President George W.
Bush: "I believed it was important to act because the institution of marriage was being
changed by the courts.").
286 See supra Introduction and text accompanying note 244.
287 Interview with Wendy Murphy, Victim Advocacy & Research Group, supra note 54.
288 Some reformers would respond that withdrawal of consent laws differ from reform of
marital rape laws because the latter involves amending legislative language while the former
concerns fundamental rights protected by the Constitution. Id. However, as both involve the
reversal of hundreds of years of common-law tradition, there is a clear parallel between the
two efforts.
289 See supra Part II.A.
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assault, as it would leave their freedoms in the hands of a slow-moving
judiciary rather than their own elected representatives. 290 Both courts and
legislatures have a place at the table of rape law reform, and it behooves
advocates to encourage both for the benefit of the women they represent.
CONCLUSION
The recent history of the reform of rape laws in this country shows that
each incremental change has met with some resistance. Changes in the
wake of the introduction of the Model Penal Code, which emphasized the
use of force in definitions of rape, influenced the states to modify their
statutes in a way many reformers viewed as negative.291 Only in recent
years, with the virtual abolition of the marital rape exemption and
widespread rejection of the resistance standard in the proof of rape charges,
have states moved towards a model in which all nonconsensual sexual
intercourse will be outlawed.292 A natural next step in this evolution is a
statute in all fifty states that explicitly prohibits forced, nonconsensual
intercourse at any time during the sexual act, rather than just at penetration.
Eight states have now made this reform a reality, with seven doing so
by court decision and one by statute.293 Two of the most recent reforms, in
California and Illinois, will likely spur action in the coming months in other
states that wish to clarify their rape statutes.294 Additionally, the recently
dismissed criminal charges against NBA superstar Kobe Bryant, as well as
the pending civil suit against him, have both drawn incredible media
attention. 295 The accompanying public scrutiny, as well as that given to
John Z., the young Illinois statute, and the cases predating them, can lead
the way towards a regime that empowers women to withdraw their consent
290 There may be other positive impacts of the statute as well. One sexual assault
counselor in Illinois expressed hope that the new law would increase the number of
acquaintance rape cases that state's attorneys are willing to prosecute. "This bill would help
a jury to understand, and give them permission to say that when she says no, it means no,
regardless of whether there was sexual activity before." Acquaintance Rape, supra note 258
(quoting Legislators: It's Still Rape, Even If She Once Said Yes, CHI. SUN-TIMEs, Feb. 12,
2003, at 10).
291 See supra Part I.B.1.
292 See supra Parts I.A, I.B.2-3.
293 See supra Part II.B.
294 See supra Parts III.A-B.
295 Although the details of the incident involving Mr. Bryant and the civil plaintiff are
hazy, and now, without a trial, may never become public, anecdotal evidence indicates that
the facts may be similar to those in John Z. and like cases; a sexual act that started out as
consensual, and at some point may have crossed the line to nonconsensual. See, e.g., Bean,
supra note 27; Attorneys Think Civil Case is a Strong One, ESPN.coM, Sept. 7, 2004, at
http://sports.espn.go.com/nba/news/story?id= 1876696&CMP=OTC-DT9705204233.
2004]
314 MATTHEWR. LYON [Vol. 95
at any time during the act of sexual intercourse. It is up to legal advocates
and concerned members of the public around the country to ensure that this
burgeoning movement takes flight in our courts and statehouses.
